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In his forthcoming examination of G. H. von Wright's tense-logic [4] , Krister Segerberg studies certain infinitary extensions of the original tense-logic created by von Wright. For one of these extensions the completeness problem turned out to be harder than was expected at first sight. 1 This paper is devoted to a proof of a completeness theorem for the extension in question, called Wl by Segerberg. We use a countable language of ordinary prepositional logic supplied with two modal operators: O ("tomorrow") and D ("always"). The relevant semantics for tense-logic based on this language uses the frame 9^ = <N, ', < >, where the successorrelation is the accessibility-relation for O and < for D, i.e., the formula O (A) is true at the point n & N iff A is true at n +1, and the formula D A is true at n € N iff for all k > n A is true at k. We assume that the reader is familiar with ordinary Kripkesemantics for modal languages Let Σ be a set of formulae from our language. Σ is said to have a model on 9^ if there is a model 9JÏ on 9Ϊ such that for some η EN it holds <3ft t = « A, for every A in Z 1 . The main part of Professor Segerberg's paper is spent on a proof that if a finite Σ is consistent in von Wright's tense logic, then it has a model on 9Ϊ. Since the rules of von Wright's logic are finitary, a set is consistent iff all its finite subsets are. As Segerberg observes, the set θ = {--Dp} U [o n (p] : n€N} is consistent in von Wright's logic, for every finite subset thereof has a model on 9^ and is thus consistent. Θ itself, however, has no model on 9R. In order to improve on this fact Segerberg introduces an infinitary extension Wl of von Wright's logic. Wl is given by a Prawitz-type natural deduction system, and we assume some familiarity with, e.g., [3] .
For every n e N:
We will prove the following theorem, first stated by Segerberg in §5 of [4] . 
and Σ h -Ό«(θΑ), and thus Σ (-o»(DÄ) and Σ \· ->o»(nA), by rule Dl(n), which contradicts the consistency of Σ.
Let Σ be a consistent set in Wl and <A 0 , A if .. .> an enumeration of our language. We define
{A n } if this is consistent, {~~"v4"} otherwise,
otherwise.
In step 2η+ 2, k should be chosen as small as possible while preserving consistency according to the Lemma. We observe that by construction each Σ η is consistent in Wl. Let Δ -U Σ η . This set Δ has all the properties needed for a canonical model proof. Hence by putting n = 0 we get the required model on 9Ï, not only for Σ but also for Δ. Note that the countability of the language is used essentially in the proof. It should be remarked here that by dropping V and ~~l from our language and adding absurdity JL as a primitive with the rules
LA -> -L ]
then one will get a system that is easily seen to be mutually interprétable with Wl. For this system one proves without much effort a normalization theorem along the lines of [3] and [2] . The remarkable ease with which the natural deduction methods work for Wl, and especially for the modified version hinted at above, should be credited to the great analogy between Wl and Peano arithmetic with the omega-rule for which it is well-known that a smooth proof theory exists.
